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The design of robust monetary policy rules has attracted con-
siderable interest in recent macroeconomic research. This interest
largely reﬂects the increased awareness on the part of policymakers
and academics alike that, when evaluating the possible consequences
of alternative monetary policies, the existing uncertainties about the
structure of the economy need to be given due account. As a re-
sult, a large body of research has been oriented toward identifying
the characteristics of monetary policy rules that perform “reason-
ably well” across a range of potentially nonnested and competing
macroeconomic models.1 While this line of research has primarily
focused on models of the U.S. economy, no systematic study has yet
been conducted for the euro area.2
In an attempt to ﬁll this gap, we concentrate on the euro area and
examine the performance and robustness of monetary policy rules us-
ing a rather diverse set of macroeconomic models of the euro area
economy. Such an examination seems particularly relevant as the
single monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has to
focus on the euro area as a whole, being a new and still relatively
unexplored economic entity, and with models of the euro area having
been developed only very recently. Speciﬁcally, our analysis relies on
four models of the euro area economy that have been built by staﬀ
of the Eurosystem in recent years. These models diﬀer considerably
in terms of size, degree of aggregation, relevance of forward-looking
behavioral elements, and adherence to microfoundations. They thus
cover a wide range of features that are a priori considered to be of
high relevance in the context of evaluating the robustness of mone-
tary policy rules.3 One of our main goals is to ascertain which of the
various features with respect to which these models diﬀer are of im-
portance when designing rules suitable for model-based evaluations
of monetary policy, and which features are, by contrast, arguably
less important.
1For an early claim in this respect see McCallum (1988).
2Earlier studies of the performance of interest-rate rules across alternative
models of the U.S. economy are provided in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993)
and Taylor (1999). More recent studies have been undertaken by Levin, Wieland,
and Williams (2003) and Levin and Williams (2003). The study of Coˆte´ et al.
(2002) focuses on models of the Canadian economy.
3Indeed, Svensson (2003) argues that models used to analyze simple monetary
policy rules, such as the Taylor rule, were too similar in structure (i.e., of the New
Keynesian variety) to constitute a true test of their robustness.
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In terms of methodology, our analysis builds on recent work by
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003) and Levin and Williams
(2003).4 This methodology involves implementing simple reaction
functions describing the response of the short-term nominal interest
rate to inﬂation and the output gap, either observed or forecast,
and then optimizing over the respective response coeﬃcients. The
performance of these optimized interest-rate rules is then evaluated
across alternative, potentially competing models with regard to their
ability to stabilize inﬂation and output around their targets, while
avoiding undue ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate itself.
Of course, variables other than inﬂation and the output gap may
enter the interest-rate rule, such as the exchange rate or monetary
and ﬁnancial-market indicators. However, the literature tends to sug-
gest that including information variables of this kind in the policy
rule yields relatively modest gains in model-based evaluations be-
cause they are typically highly correlated with the interest rate itself
or closely related with the measures of inﬂation and the output gap
entering the rule (although this result may not hold in suﬃciently
complex models). Furthermore, simple rules with a feedback to a
small set of variables are arguably more robust to model misspeciﬁ-
cation and uncertainty than rules based on a larger set of variables,
which might overﬁt speciﬁc model characteristics.
From an institutional viewpoint, the advantage of simple interest-
rate rules is clearly their transparency and, thus, the ease with which
they may be communicated to and monitored by the outside world.
While it is unlikely that monetary policymakers will follow their lit-
eral execution, such rules may nonetheless be a useful benchmark
for assessing the actual conduct of monetary policy. Likewise, from
an empirical point of view, simple interest-rate rules seem to match
the data well for the United States as well as a number of European
countries (see Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler 1998). More recently, evi-
dence for the euro area as a whole has been provided by Gerdesmeier
and Roﬃa (2004).
4There are alternative approaches to analyzing the consequences of uncer-
tainty about the structure of the economy (see, e.g., Giannoni 2002; Giannoni
and Woodford 2002; Hansen and Sargent 2002; Onatski and Stock 2002; Onatski
and Williams 2003; and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen 2001). This coexistence of
alternative approaches reﬂects the fact that there has not yet emerged a consensus
on how to address the issue of model uncertainty.
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The ﬁndings of our analysis are broadly consistent with the re-
sults documented for models of the U.S. economy: backward-looking
models require relatively more aggressive policies with, at most, mod-
erate inertia; rules that are optimized for such models tend to per-
form reasonably well in forward-looking models, while the reverse
is not necessarily true; and, hence, the operating characteristics of
robust rules (i.e., rules that perform satisfactorily in all models) are
heavily weighted toward those required by backward-looking mod-
els. In the course of collecting these results, we highlight a number
of model features (notably, the degree of forward-lookingness) that
play a crucial role in shaping the operating characteristics of opti-
mized interest-rate rules. This in turn suggests that future empirical
research that aims at casting additional light on these features may
enhance the reliability and usefulness of interest-rate rules for model-
based evaluations of monetary policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1
outlines the set of euro area models used in our analysis and illus-
trates the implied diﬀerences in inﬂation and output-gap dynamics
in response to a monetary policy shock. Section 2 brieﬂy describes
the methodology used for evaluating the performance of interest-rate
rules and provides a set of optimized benchmark rules for each of the
euro area models under examination. Section 3 evaluates the robust-
ness of these benchmark rules when there is uncertainty about the
true structure of the euro area economy, as represented by the coex-
istence of possibly competing models, while section 4 identiﬁes the
operating characteristics of rules that attain satisfactory outcomes
across the set of models used. Section 5 reports additional sensitivity
analysis, and section 6 concludes.
1. The Models of the Euro Area
To examine the performance of monetary policy rules across a range
of potentially competing models of the euro area economy, we uti-
lize a set of four macroeconomic models that diﬀer considerably in
terms of variable and country coverage, relevance of forward-looking
behavioral elements, and adherence to microfoundations. All models
are estimated with aggregate euro area-wide data except one, which
separately models the three largest euro area economies. Two of
the models are entirely or at least predominantly backward looking,
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while forward-looking elements abound in the other two. All models
are consistent with basic economic principles; however, there is only
one in our set of models that is strictly based on the assumption
of optimizing agents. Hence, the models under examination cover a
fairly broad range of diﬀerent modeling strategies.
In the remainder of this section, we brieﬂy present the four mod-
els of the euro area and illustrate the implied diﬀerences in inﬂation
and output-gap dynamics in response to a monetary policy shock.
1.1 An Outline of the Euro Area Models
1.1.1 The Coenen-Wieland Model
The Coenen-Wieland (CW) model (see Coenen and Wieland 2000)
is a small-scale model of aggregate supply and aggregate demand
that is designed to capture the broad characteristics of inﬂation and
output dynamics in the euro area. Since its development, the model
has been mainly used as a laboratory for evaluating the performance
of alternative monetary policy strategies.
The supply side of the model incorporates price and wage stagger-
ing, with wage setters negotiating long-term nominal wage contracts
with reference to past contracts that are still in eﬀect and future con-
tracts that will be negotiated over the life of the current contract.
If wage setters expect the output gap to be positive, they adjust
the current contract wages upward, and vice versa. Consequently,
inﬂation depends on its own leads and lags, excess-demand condi-
tions, and transitory contract wage shocks—the latter representing
“cost-push” shocks. There are two versions of the supply side that
feature distinct types of staggered wage contracts: the nominal wage
contracting speciﬁcation due to Taylor (1980) and the relative real
wage contracting speciﬁcation by Fuhrer and Moore (1995).5 The
two speciﬁcations diﬀer with respect to the degree of inﬂation per-
sistence that they induce, with Fuhrer-Moore-type contracts giving
5While the two types of speciﬁcations represent rules for price and wage set-
ting that are not explicitly derived from a framework with optimizing agents,
they need not be necessarily inconsistent with such a framework. More recently,
Taylor-type contracts have been analyzed within more fully ﬂeshed-out dynamic
general equilibrium models (see, e.g., Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2000 or King
and Wolman 1999). Fuhrer-Moore-type contracts, however, have typically been
criticized for lacking microfoundations.
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more weight to past inﬂation developments. In this paper, the version
with Taylor-type contracts is used.6
A simple aggregate demand relationship relates the output gap
(measured as the deviation of actual output from a smooth trend)
to several lags of itself, the ex-ante long-term real interest rate, and
a transitory demand shock. The long-term real rate is determined
jointly by a term-structure relationship and the Fisher equation. The
short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of monetary pol-
icy, and changes in the latter aﬀect aggregate demand through the
impact on the ex-ante long-term real interest rate.
1.1.2 The Smets-Wouters Model
The Smets-Wouters (SW) model (see Smets and Wouters 2003) is an
extended version of the standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices and wages.
The model is estimated by Bayesian techniques using seven euro
area macroeconomic time series: real gross domestic product (GDP),
consumption, investment, employment, real wages, inﬂation, and the
nominal short-term interest rate.
The model features three types of economic agents: households,
ﬁrms, and the monetary policy authority. Households maximize a
utility function with two arguments (goods and leisure) over an inﬁ-
nite life horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function relative
to a time-varying external habit-formation variable. Labor is diﬀer-
entiated over households, so that there is some monopoly power over
wages, which results in an explicit wage equation and allows for the
introduction of sticky nominal wages a` la Calvo (1983). Households
also rent capital services to ﬁrms and decide how much capital to ac-
cumulate given certain capital adjustment costs. As the rental price
of capital goes up, the capital stock can be used more intensively ac-
cording to some cost schedule. Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods,
decide on labor and capital inputs, and set prices, again a` la Calvo
(1983). The Calvo model in both wage and price setting is augmented
6See Coenen (2003) for an evaluation of the performance of monetary pol-
icy rules across the two variants with Taylor- and Fuhrer-Moore-type contracts,
respectively. This paper shows that, when faced with uncertainty about the pre-
vailing degree of inﬂation persistence, a cautious monetary policymaker is well-
advised to design interest-rate policies under the assumption that the inﬂation
process is characterized by a high degree of persistence—as induced by Fuhrer-
Moore-type contracts.
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by the assumption that those prices and wages that cannot be freely
set are partially indexed to past inﬂation. Prices are therefore set as
a function of current and expected real marginal cost, but are also
inﬂuenced by past inﬂation. Real marginal cost depends on wages
and the rental rate of capital. The short-term nominal interest rate
is the instrument of monetary policy.7
The stochastic behavior of the model is driven by ten exoge-
nous shocks: ﬁve shocks arising from technology and preferences,
three cost-push shocks, and two monetary policy shocks. The ﬁrst
set of shocks is assumed to follow ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes,
whereas the second set is assumed to follow serially uncorrelated pro-
cesses. Consistent with the DSGE setup, potential output is deﬁned
as the level of output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices and
wages in the absence of cost-push shocks.
1.1.3 The Area-Wide Model
The Area-Wide Model (AWM; see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre 2001) is
a medium-size structural macroeconomic model that treats the euro
area as a single economy.8 It has a long-run neoclassical equilibrium
with a vertical Phillips curve, but with some short-run frictions in
price and wage setting and factor demands. Consequently, activity
is demand-determined in the short run but supply-determined in
the long run. In the latter, employment converges to a level consis-
tent with the exogenously given level of equilibrium unemployment,
and factor demands are consistent with the solution of the ﬁrms’
proﬁt-maximization problem. Stock-ﬂow adjustments are accounted
for by, for example, the inclusion of a wealth term in consumption. At
present, the treatment of expectations in the model is quite limited.
With the exception of the exchange rate (determined by uncovered
interest parity) and the long-term nominal interest rate (modeled
by a term-structure relationship), the model embodies backward-
looking expectations.
7Extending the study of Coenen (2003), Angeloni, Coenen, and Smets (2003)
utilize the SW model to analyze the design of monetary policy when the monetary
policymaker is uncertain about the degree of nominal as well as real persistence.
The results of this analysis conﬁrm the conclusions of the earlier study.
8For an examination of optimal monetary policy in the context of the AWM
alone, see Dieppe, Ku¨ster, and McAdam (2004).
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As to the mechanisms through which monetary policy aﬀects the
economy, aggregate demand in the AWM is presently inﬂuenced only
by short-term real interest rates. Long-term nominal rates determine
the government’s debt service but do not explicitly enter investment
decisions. The expectations channel in principle allows monetary pol-
icy to inﬂuence inﬂation via wage- and price-setting behavior. In ad-
dition to these inﬂuences, further eﬀects enter through the exchange
rate. Apart from an indirect eﬀect of exchange rates on domestic de-
mand, there is also a direct exchange-rate eﬀect on consumer price
inﬂation through the price for imported goods. The output gap is
deﬁned as the ratio of actual output to potential output, which is
based on an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function with con-
stant returns to scale and Hicks-neutral technical progress. For this,
trend total factor productivity has been estimated within-sample by
applying the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to the Solow residual derived
from the production function.
1.1.4 A Disaggregate Model of the Euro Area
The Disaggregate Model (DM) of the euro area used in Angelini et
al. (2002) and Monteforte and Siviero (2002) is a multicountry ver-
sion of the simple backward-looking two-equation model in Rude-
busch and Svensson (1999). It consists of an aggregate supply equa-
tion and an aggregate demand equation for each of the three largest
economies in the euro area: Germany, France, and Italy, which jointly
account for over 70 percent of euro area GDP. The ﬁrst equation,
interpretable as a Phillips curve, determines inﬂation in each coun-
try as a function of lagged inﬂation and the output gap, as well
as inﬂation “imported” from the other two countries. The sum of
the coeﬃcients on lagged and imported inﬂation is constrained to
equal unity (a restriction accepted by the data), so that a long-run
vertical Phillips curve exists for all countries. The second equation
represents an IS curve and relates the output gap of each country
(modeled as the deviation of actual output from a smooth trend) to
its own lagged values, the short-term real interest rate, and the out-
put gaps in the other two countries (a design meant to capture the
trade linkages among euro area economies). Euro area inﬂation and
the aggregate output gap are determined via identities as weighted
averages of the corresponding individual country variables. Finally,
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the area-wide short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of
monetary policy.
As the model allows for simultaneous cross-country linkages, it
was estimated with the three-stage least-squares (3SLS) method us-
ing data on inﬂation, output, and nominal interest rates. Not all
cross-country terms are signiﬁcant in all equations. This results
in a clear causal pattern, with the German economy aﬀecting the
other two comparatively more, and with the Italian economy be-
ing essentially recursive. Furthermore, the estimation results indi-
cate that there exists a signiﬁcant degree of heterogeneity among
the three economies included in the model.9 Accordingly, the re-
sults in Angelini et al. (2002) suggest that monetary policy eﬀective-
ness may be considerably enhanced if country-speciﬁc information is
used.
1.2 Diﬀerences in Monetary Policy Transmission
Figure 1 provides a comparison of the eﬀects of an unexpected one-
quarter tightening of monetary policy by 100 basis points in the four
diﬀerent models of the euro area, with the monetary policymaker
following the interest-rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993) thereafter.
Panel A of the ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of annual inﬂa-
tion and the output gap for the largely forward-looking models (CW
and SW), while panel B shows the responses for the predominantly
backward-looking models (AWM and DM).
Qualitatively, the tightening of policy has the same consequences
in the four models. As the short-term nominal interest rate rises un-
expectedly, demand falls short of potential and inﬂation falls below
the monetary policymaker’s target, with the dynamic adjustment
being drawn out lastingly. Quantitatively, however, the responses ex-
hibit some noticeable diﬀerences. Most importantly, the disinﬂation
eﬀect is considerably larger and more persistent in the backward-
looking models with the timing of the peak eﬀect on inﬂation notice-
ably delayed relative to that on the output gap. By contrast, in the
9Monteforte and Siviero (2002) also report estimates of an aggregate compan-
ion of the DM (referred to as Aggregate Model, AM, of the euro area), consisting
of just two equations. Both statistical and economic criteria indicate that the
DM is to be preferred to the AM.
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Figure 1. Responses to an Interest-Rate Shock (100 Basis
Points) under Taylor’s Rule
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
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B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
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forward-looking models, the timing of the peak eﬀect on inﬂation is
much closer to that on the output gap, with the reversion to base of
both inﬂation and the output gap being more rapid and smoother.
Diﬀerences in the responses of the output gap, notably in the initial
periods, largely reﬂect diﬀerences in the employed output-gap con-
cepts. Overall, this suggests that the degree of forward-lookingness
is of utmost relevance for explaining the diﬀerences in inﬂation and
output-gap dynamics across models.
Based on the documented patterns of the dynamic responses to
the monetary policy shock under Taylor’s rule, we summarize that
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a given interest-rate rule may perform quite diﬀerently in terms of
inﬂation and output-gap stabilization, depending on the characteris-
tics of the particular euro area model used. Hence, it is evident why
monetary policymakers should be concerned about the design of the
interest-rate rule to be used in model-based analyses.
2. Evaluating the Performance of Interest-Rate Rules
We now proceed to describe the methodology that we will use to
evaluate the stabilization performance of alternative monetary poli-
cies across our set of models of the euro area economy. Our starting
point is an evaluation of simple interest-rate rules that respond to
outcomes or forecasts of annual inﬂation and the output gap and al-
low for inertia due to dependence on the lagged short-term nominal
interest rate.
2.1 The Methodology
Following the approach in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003), we
consider a three-parameter family of simple interest-rate rules,
it = ρ it−1+(1−ρ) ( r∗+Et [ π˜t+θ ] )+αEt [ π˜t+θ − π∗ ]+β Et [ yt+κ ] ,
where it denotes the short-term nominal interest rate, r∗ is the equi-
librium real interest rate, π˜t = pt − pt−4 is the annual inﬂation rate,
π∗ denotes the monetary policymaker’s inﬂation target, and yt is the
output gap.10 Under rational expectations, the operator Et[ · ] in-
dicates the model-consistent forecast of a particular variable, using
information available in period t.11 The integer parameters θ and
κ denote the length of the forecast horizons for inﬂation and the
output gap, respectively. This speciﬁcation accommodates forecast-
based rules (with forecast horizons θ, κ > 0) as well as outcome-based
10Even in the case where the multicountry model DM is used, both inﬂation
and the output gap are to be interpreted as area-wide variables, reﬂecting the
assumption that the policymaker is concerned with area-wide developments.
11We employ the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985), which uses
the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method for solving linear rational expectations
models, to compute model-consistent expectations.
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rules (θ = κ = 0) and simpliﬁes to the one proposed by Taylor (1993)
if θ = κ = 0, ρ = 0 and α = β = 0.5.12
For ﬁxed inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons θ and κ, the
above family of interest-rate rules is deﬁned by the response coef-
ﬁcients ρ, α, and β. The coeﬃcients α and β represent the policy-
maker’s short-term reaction to inﬂation in deviation from target and
the output gap, respectively, while ρ determines the inertia of the
interest-rate response, commonly interpreted as the desired degree
of policy “smoothing.” The latter plays an important role for model-
based evaluations of interest-rate rules. In particular, the degree to
which the optimal policy in any given model embodies smoothing
tends to depend largely on the expectation formation mechanism
embedded in that model. Typically, if expectations are backward
looking, values of ρ at or above unity can perform poorly since they
may engender undampened oscillations in the model economy due to
instrument instability (see, e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 and
Batini and Nelson 2001). By contrast, models with largely forward-
looking expectations, notably small optimizing New Keynesian mod-
els, tend to favor a comparatively high degree of smoothing because
the inertial adjustment of the short-term interest rate enables the
policymaker to steer expectations and thereby to stabilize the econ-
omy more eﬀectively.
In our evaluation of the stabilization performance of variants of
the above family of interest-rate rules, we assume that the mone-
tary policymaker has a standard loss function equal to the weighted
sum of the unconditional variances of inﬂation, the output gap, and
changes in the short-term nominal interest rate,
L = Var[πt ] + λVar[ yt ] + µVar[∆it ].
Here, inﬂation is measured by the annualized one-quarter inﬂation
rate, πt = 4 (pt−pt−1). The weight λ ≥ 0 refers to the policymaker’s
preference for reducing output variability relative to inﬂation vari-
ability, and the weight µ ≥ 0 on the variability of changes in the
12In the special case with ρ = 1, the rule represents a ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule, a
class of rules that Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) advocate as being robust
when examining the performance of simple interest-rate rules across a set of dis-
tinct models of the U.S. economy—none of them, however, being fully backward-
looking. Orphanides and Williams (2002) emphasize that ﬁrst-diﬀerence rules are
also robust to misperceptions about the equilibrium real interest rate r∗.
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short-term nominal interest rate, ∆it = it − it−1, reﬂects a desire
to avoid undue ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate itself.13 Es-
tablishing this loss function is consistent with the assumption that
the policymaker aims at stabilizing inﬂation around the inﬂation tar-
get π∗ and actual output around potential, with the concern regard-
ing excessive interest-rate variability typically justiﬁed by ﬁnancial
stability considerations.14
For ﬁxed inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons θ and κ, the
three-parameter family of interest-rate rules deﬁned above is opti-
mized by minimizing the policymaker’s loss function L with respect
to the coeﬃcients ρ, α, and β. In this context, we repeatedly need
to compute the unconditional variances of the models’ endogenous
variables for a given interest-rate rule. In preparation for these com-
putations, we ﬁrst identify the series of historical shocks that would
be consistent with the alternative models under rational expecta-
tions. Based on the covariance matrix of the historical shocks, it
is then possible to calculate the unconditional covariance matrix of
the endogenous variables for any given interest-rate rule by applying
standard methods to the reduced-form solution of the model includ-
ing that rule.15
In the subsequent analysis, we will consider four alternative
values for the relative weight on output-gap variability, namely
λ = 0, 1/3, 1, and 3. Regarding the weight on the variability of
interest-rate changes, we will concentrate the analysis on a ﬁxed
value of µ = 0.10. We shall brieﬂy discuss additional results for a
lower weight of µ = 0.01 in the sensitivity analysis in section 5.
There, we will also report on results for interest-rate rules that only
13For an explicit derivation of the policymaker’s loss function L from quadratic
intertemporal preferences, the reader is referred to Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999). In Svensson’s terminology, the case of λ = µ = 0 corresponds to “strict”
inﬂation targeting, while “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting is characterized by λ, µ > 0
(see Svensson 1999).
14It is recognized that it would be beneﬁcial to use a welfare criterion de-
rived as an approximation of the representative agent’s utility function (see, e.g.,
Rotemberg and Woodford 1997). The weights in this approximate welfare crite-
rion would be functions of the parameters of the structural model itself. However,
to the extent that the models used in this paper, with the exception of the SW
model, are lacking microfoundations, a well-deﬁned welfare criterion does not
exist.
15The exception is the SW model, for which the covariance matrix of shocks is
estimated jointly with the model’s structural parameters.
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allow for a response to lagged inﬂation and the lagged output gap;
that is, with θ = κ = −1. Such rules have been proposed as a proxy
for actual policymaking in “real time” (see McCallum 1988).
2.2 The Performance of Optimized Benchmark Rules
As benchmarks for evaluating the performance of simple interest-
rate rules across our set of models, we focus on two types of rules:
outcome-based rules with θ = κ = 0, and forecast-based rules that
relate the interest rate to the one-year-ahead forecast of inﬂation and
the contemporaneous output gap with θ = 4 and κ = 0.
Table 1 reports the optimized response coeﬃcients of the two
types of rules for the four diﬀerent models of the euro area economy
and for alternative values of the preference parameter λ, together
with an indication of their stabilization performance. The latter is
measured by the value of the policymaker’s loss function yielded
under the rule optimized for a particular model L and alternatively,
in relative terms, as the percentage-point diﬀerence of the loss under
the optimized rule from the loss under the fully optimal policy for
that model, %∆L.16 Panel A in table 1 indicates the results for the
largely forward-looking models (CW and SW), while panel B shows
the results for the predominantly backward-looking models (AWM
and DM).
We start with the results for the forward-looking models in
panel A and observe that, regardless of the policymaker’s prefer-
ence for output stabilization, the optimized rules are characterized
by a substantial degree of interest-rate smoothing, as captured by the
high coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate, ρ. Interestingly, with a low
weight on output stabilization and, in particular, with the inﬂation
forecast horizon extending one year into the future, the magnitude
of ρ tends to exceed unity, notably for the SW model. This feature
is commonly referred to as “super-inertia” in the interest rate. Not
surprisingly, as the weight on output stabilization increases, the co-
eﬃcient on the output gap, β, rises while the coeﬃcient on inﬂation,
16For the CW and SW models, as well as the AWM, the fully optimal policy cor-
responds to the optimal policy under commitment. See Finan and Tetlow (1999)
for details on computing the optimal policy under commitment for large rational
expectations models using AIM. Details regarding the unconditional variability
of the individual target variables underlying the calculation of the loss function,
L, can be found in table A of the appendix.
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Table 1. The Stabilization Performance of Optimized
Interest-Rate Rules
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
θ κ λ ρ α β L %∆L ρ α β L %∆L
0 0 0 0.97 0.81 0.10 1.8 2 1.03 0.81 0.08 1.0 3
1/3 0.81 0.49 0.86 2.5 5 1.00 0.64 1.53 1.3 8
1 0.79 0.30 1.55 3.2 4 0.99 0.43 3.05 1.5 6
3 0.77 0.23 2.50 4.7 3 0.92 0.11 5.87 1.7 5
4 0 0 1.59 4.36 −0.25 1.9 5 1.96 6.59 −0.05 1.0 6
1/3 0.83 1.18 0.84 2.6 6 1.01 1.19 1.50 1.3 9
1 0.79 0.76 1.55 3.2 4 1.00 0.79 2.99 1.5 7
3 0.77 0.59 2.49 4.6 3 0.99 0.53 5.64 1.7 5
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
θ κ λ ρ α β L %∆L ρ α β L %∆L
0 0 0 0.44 1.14 1.13 1.3 26 0.31 5.81 3.65 6.0 54
1/3 0.39 0.93 2.37 1.9 20 0.28 5.78 3.89 6.9 53
1 0.44 0.65 3.69 2.6 18 0.25 5.71 4.26 8.5 51
3 0.50 0.40 5.79 3.8 15 0.19 5.59 5.01 12.5 47
4 0 0 0.47 2.22 0.55 1.2 15 0.55 3.99 0.56 4.6 20
1/3 0.37 2.47 1.67 1.8 13 0.51 4.06 0.74 5.4 21
1 0.39 2.49 3.00 2.5 12 0.46 4.18 1.05 6.9 23
3 0.42 2.38 5.12 3.7 11 0.36 4.39 1.75 10.6 24
Note: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and
κ), for each preference parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates
the optimized interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α, and β), the value of the
policymaker’s loss function (L), and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter
from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L).
α, falls. As regards the stabilization performance of the optimized
interest-rate rules, we observe that the implied values of the pol-
icymaker’s loss function are typically somewhat larger in the CW
model, possibly reﬂecting a less dominant role for the expectations
channel in transmitting monetary policy to aggregate demand. At
the same time, for both models the performance of monetary policy
deteriorates fairly little when the policymaker follows a relatively
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simple optimized interest-rate rule rather than the fully optimal
policy. The value of the policymaker’s loss function never rises by
more than 9 percentage points. We also observe that there is no dis-
cernible stabilization gain from following forecast-based as opposed
to outcome-based rules.
Turning to the backward-looking models in panel B, a number
of diﬀerences are noteworthy. First, the optimized interest-rate rules
embody only a mild degree of smoothing, with ρ varying between
0.4 and 0.5 for the AWM and between 0.2 and 0.6 for the DM. This
discrepancy largely reﬂects the fact that expectations, notably those
determining long-term interest rates, do not play a dominant role in
either model. Thus, there is no scope for increasing the eﬀectiveness
of monetary policy by an inertial adjustment of the short-term rate.
Second, the optimized response coeﬃcients α and β are typically
quite a bit larger than for the forward-looking models, in particular
for the DM. This mirrors the fact that, in backward-looking models,
inﬂation and the output gap are much harder to stabilize and, as
a result, the policymaker has to respond more aggressively to any
signs of rising inﬂation and cumulating output gaps. Third, when
compared with the outcomes under the fully optimal policies, the
stabilization performance of simple interest-rate rules deteriorates
quite substantially, albeit less strongly for the AWM. In the extreme
case when the policymaker does not attach any weight to output
stabilization, the loss under the optimized outcome-based rule ex-
ceeds the loss associated with the fully optimal policy by more than
50 percentage points for the DM, while the loss diﬀers by about 25
percentage points for the AWM.17 In the case of the AWM, the rel-
atively poor performance of simple optimized rules is likely due to
the model’s fairly high degree of structural detail and its rather com-
plex dynamics (see Finan and Tetlow [1999] for a similar observation
based on the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US model).18 Similarly,
17Evidently, while the values of the loss function obtained for the AWM are
comparable with those yielded in the forward-looking models, the losses for the
DM are quite a bit larger.
18Giannoni and Woodford (2002) show that the fully optimal policy for a
model, regardless of its degree of structural detail, can be represented as a gener-
alized Taylor rule, in which the relation between the interest-rate instrument and
the other target variables includes leads and lags of the target variables. There-
fore, the relatively poor performance of the simple interest-rate rules examined
here ought to be mitigated by the inclusion of additional leads and lags of the
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the DM departs from the rest of the models to the extent that it is
the only model in which the three largest euro area economies are
modeled separately. Fourth, contrary to the results for the forward-
looking models, there are substantial gains in performance from using
forecast-based rather than outcome-based rules, with the maximum
gain equal to 11 percentage points for the AWM and 34 percentage
points for the DM (in the case of λ = 0). We attribute these im-
provements in performance to the information-encompassing nature
of forecast-based rules, with the inﬂation forecast incorporating in-
formation about incipient risks to future inﬂation arising from a pos-
sibly larger set of underlying determinants (see Batini and Haldane
1999) and the transmission lag of monetary policy (see Batini and
Nelson 2001).
3. Evaluating the Robustness of Interest-Rate Rules
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed that the policymaker
knows the “true” model of the euro area economy when optimizing
variants of the three-parameter family of interest-rate rules for any
given model. While the optimized rules typically succeeded in sta-
bilizing inﬂation and output satisfactorily for that given model, we
now proceed to analyze to what extent the optimized rules are robust
to model uncertainty, in the sense of also performing reasonably well
across the other, possibly competing models of the euro area.
3.1 The Performance of Optimized Rules Across Models
Table 2 summarizes our ﬁndings regarding the stabilization per-
formance of the optimized benchmark rules documented in table 1
above across our set of models. Here, performance is measured
by the value of the policymaker’s loss function, L, and by the
percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter from the loss under the
fully optimal policy, %∆L, when the rule optimized for any partic-
ular model m is evaluated in the possibly competing model n = m.
Panel A in table 2 reports the ﬁndings for the rules optimized for
inﬂation rate, the output gap, and the interest rate. In fact, Williams (2003)
shows for the FRB/US model that moderately more complicated Taylor-type
interest-rate rules that respond to a slightly enhanced number of lags of the target
variables yield noticeable, albeit fairly small, stabilization gains over optimized
three-parameter rules.
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Table 2. The Robustness of Optimized Interest-Rate Rules
in Models of the Euro Area
A. Rules Optimized for the Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules Optimized for CW Rules Optimized for SW
L %∆L L %∆L
θ κ λ SW AWM DM SW AWM DM CW AWM DM CW AWM DM
0 0 0 1.0 ∞ ∞ 6 ∞ ∞ 1.9 ∞ ∞ 3 ∞ ∞
1/3 1.4 2.5 35.1 15 56 684 2.7 4.8 23.2 13 202 419
1 1.6 3.4 465.6 18 54 8228 3.7 4.6 59.8 23 110 969
3 2.0 5.2 ∞ 25 58 ∞ 6.2 6.1 ∞ 38 85 ∞
4 0 0 1.0 ∞ ∞ 9 ∞ ∞ 1.9 ∞ ∞ 6 ∞ ∞
1/3 1.4 2.4 11.4 15 52 155 2.8 5.2 ∞ 14 232 ∞
1 1.6 3.2 23.3 17 45 318 3.7 4.9 67.4 23 122 1106
3 2.0 5.0 73.3 25 51 763 6.4 5.7 ∞ 43 72 ∞
B. Rules Optimized for the Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules Optimized for AWM Rules Optimized for DM
L %∆L L %∆L
θ κ λ CW SW DM CW SW DM CW SW AWM CW SW AWM
0 0 0 2.2 1.3 48.6 20 36 1157 3.4 1.4 2.0 87 56 94
1/3 2.7 1.5 222.2 11 24 4859 3.8 1.7 2.3 58 39 43
1 3.5 1.7 ∞ 14 23 ∞ 4.7 2.2 2.7 53 55 24
3 ME 2.0 ∞ ME 23 ∞ 6.8 3.2 3.9 52 97 17
4 0 0 2.3 1.3 11.8 25 40 205 2.5 1.3 1.3 40 37 27
1/3 2.7 1.6 15.2 13 30 238 2.8 1.7 2.1 16 35 30
1 3.4 1.8 20.2 13 31 261 3.7 2.3 3.1 20 64 41
3 5.2 2.1 34.3 16 31 303 5.8 3.6 5.2 29 120 56
Note: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and
κ), for each preference parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the
value of the policymaker’s loss function (L) and the percentage-point diﬀerence
of the latter from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L), when the rule
optimized for model m is evaluated in model n = m. The notation “ME” indicates
that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria; the notation “∞” indicates
that the implemented rule results in instability.
the forward-looking models, while panel B documents those for the
backward-looking ones.
Beginning with the rules optimized for the forward-looking mod-
els in panel A, we observe that rules that are optimized for the CW
model also perform satisfactorily when evaluated in the SW model,
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and vice versa. For example, with θ = κ = 0 and λ = 1/3, imple-
menting the CW-based rule in the SW model leads to an increase in
the loss function of about 15 percentage points, relative to the loss
associated with the fully optimal policy for the SW model. When
compared to the performance of the interest-rate rule optimized for
the SW model itself (see table 1), the loss increases by about 7 per-
centage points. Similarly, when implementing the SW-based rule in
the CW model, the increase in the loss function amounts to 13 and
8 percentage points, depending on the benchmark for comparison.
By contrast, when evaluating the CW- and SW-based rules in the
backward-looking models, the performance of monetary policy tends
to deteriorate quite substantially. For the AWM, the loss increases by
about 50 percentage points relative to the fully optimal policy when
CW-based rules are implemented and by more than 100 percentage
points on average for SW-based rules. The deterioration is found to
be particularly dramatic if the policymaker puts zero weight on out-
put stabilization since the CW- and SW-based rules do not succeed
in stabilizing the AWM any longer. Finally, when evaluated in the
DM, the performance of CW- and SW-based rules is even worse,
generating even higher increases in relative losses and resulting in
instability more often.
Turning to the rules optimized for the backward-looking models
in panel B, we observe that the AWM-based rules typically result
in reasonable stabilization outcomes when evaluated in the CW or
the SW model. The exception is the outcome-based rule for λ = 3,
which yields multiple equilibria when implemented in the CW model.
By contrast, the AWM-based rules do not perform satisfactorily in
the DM and may occasionally even generate instability. Finally, the
DM-based rules result in a substantial deterioration in the perfor-
mance of monetary policy when evaluated in any of the three other
models, although the deterioration exceeds 100 percentage points
only in exceptional cases. Interestingly, for forecast-based rules, the
deterioration is found to be somewhat more benign.
Based on these results, we conclude that simple interest-rate
rules that are designed for the predominantly backward-looking euro
area models tend to perform reasonably well in the largely forward-
looking models, while the reverse is not necessarily true.19 The
19It is interesting to note that the aggregate companion of the DM (AM; see
footnote 9) demands policies that are closer to those obtained for the AWM (the
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fault-tolerance analysis undertaken in the next section will cast some
further light on the reasons underlying these ﬁndings.
3.2 A Fault-Tolerance Analysis of Optimized Rules
Fault-tolerance analysis of optimized interest-rate rules, as proposed
by Levin and Williams (2003), is deemed to provide useful insights
into the reasons that underlie our earlier ﬁndings. Fault-tolerance
analysis is a concept borrowed from engineering and involves, in the
present context, appraising the increase in the loss function that re-
sults when a single parameter of an optimized interest-rate rule is
varied, holding the other parameters constant at their optimized val-
ues. A highly fault tolerant model is one for which the parameters
of the rule may vary over a relatively broad range of values without
resulting in a large deterioration of its performance. By contrast,
an intolerant model would be a model whose performance deterio-
rates dramatically as soon as one deviates even modestly from some
optimized parameter value (i.e., the loss function exhibits strong
curvature with respect to suboptimal variations in some parameter).
Clearly, if one is dealing with a set of relatively tolerant models,
there is a fair chance to ﬁnd a robust policy rule. If all models are
intolerant, then a robust rule may not exist.
Figure 2 depicts the fault tolerances of our four models for the
case θ = κ = 0 and λ = 1/3 (i.e., for the outcome-based rules
obtained with a moderate weight on output stabilization).20 Each
curve shows the percentage-point change in the policymaker’s loss
function under the optimized rule as a single parameter is varied,
with its minimum of zero attained at the optimized value itself. As
can be seen in the ﬁgure, while any single parameter may be varied
over a relatively broad range of values without deteriorating dra-
matically the performance of the individual model concerned, there
are no obvious overlapping regions of high mutual fault tolerance
for all four models under examination and for all three policy-rule
parameters at the same time.
other predominantly backward-looking model), suggesting that the choice of the
degree of aggregation is also a relevant factor in shaping the results.
20For other values of the preference parameter λ, the results are qualitatively
similar.
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Figure 2. Fault-Tolerance Analysis of Outcome-Based
Interest-Rate Rules
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Note: For λ = 1/3 and for each model, the ﬁgure indicates the percentage-point
change in the policymaker’s loss function (%∆L) under the optimized outcome-
based interest-rate rule (θ = κ = 0) as a single parameter (ρ, α, or β) of the
optimized rule is varied, holding the other two parameters ﬁxed at their respective
optimized values.
Regarding the fault tolerances with respect to the smoothing
coeﬃcient ρ (displayed in the upper panel of the ﬁgure), the two
forward-looking models perform best when ρ is close to unity, while
the performance for both the AWM and DM deteriorates quite
markedly in this region, eventually resulting in instrument instability
for the DM. In contrast, the AWM prefers a ρ coeﬃcient of somewhat
below 0.5 and the DM an even lower coeﬃcient of about 0.25. Values
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of ρ in this region, however, tend to yield indeterminate equilibria
for the forward-looking models, notably for the CW model. With
respect to the response coeﬃcient α (depicted in the middle panel),
the forward-looking models and the AWM seem mutually tolerant to
variations in α in the region of close to 0 to 2.5. The DM, however,
behaves very diﬀerently in its optimal prescription for α, demanding
a signiﬁcantly higher value of about 6, but with the curvature of
the loss function in that region being modest. By contrast, as shown
in the lower panel, a comfortable region of relatively high mutual
tolerance seems to exist with respect to variations in the response
coeﬃcient β in the range of 2 to 4. While the DM favors a strong
response to the output gap in the range of 2 to 7.5, the three other
models perform satisfactorily as a group for coeﬃcients in the range
of 0.5 to 4, with the CW model constraining the upper bound of this
range.
Interestingly, as shown in ﬁgure 3, the four models exhibit consid-
erably larger regions of mutual fault tolerance when the policymaker
follows a forecast-based rule with θ = 4 and κ = 0. In this case,
variations in ρ in the range of 0.4 to 0.7 result in a reasonable per-
formance of all four models. Similarly, there are regions of mutual
tolerance with respect to variations in α and β, the regions being
centered at 3.5 and 1, respectively.
4. Designing Robust Interest-Rate Rules
The fault-tolerance analysis in the previous section has provided
an indication under which circumstances a robust interest-rate rule
might exist for our set of euro area models. However, to the extent
that fault-tolerance analysis rests on suboptimal variations in a sin-
gle policy-rule parameter, holding ﬁxed the other parameters at their
optimized values, we ﬁnally proceed to use a more formal approach
that allows taking into account the interaction among all policy-
rule parameters to identify the operating characteristics of interest-
rate rules that are likely to yield satisfactory outcomes across our
models.
In search of such robust rules we follow the Bayesian ap-
proach outlined in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003)
and optimize the response coeﬃcients of the three-parameter fam-
ily of interest-rate rules across our four models simultaneously by
Vol. 1 No. 1 Interest-Rate Rules in Models of the Euro Area 117
Figure 3. Fault-Tolerance Analysis of Forecast-Based
Interest-Rate Rules
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Note: For λ = 1/3 and for each model, the ﬁgure indicates the percentage-point
change in the policymaker’s loss function (%∆L) under the optimized forecast-
based interest-rate rule (θ = 4, κ = 0) as a single parameter (ρ, α, or β) of the
optimized rule is varied, holding the other two parameters ﬁxed at their respective
optimized values.
minimizing a weighted average of the loss functions associated with
the individual models,
L¯ =
∑
m∈M
ωm Lm,
where ωm denotes the weight attached to any given model m ∈
M ⊆ {CW, SW, AWM, DM } with ωm > 0 and ∑ωm = 1. For
ωm = 1/|M|, the average loss function corresponds to the expected
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Table 3. The Stabilization Performance of Bayesian Robust
Interest-Rate Rules
Lm generated in %∆Lm generated in
θ κ λ ρ α β CW SW AWM DM CW SW AWM DM
A. Optimization Across All Models
0 0 0 0.54 3.38 2.28 2.6 1.3 1.6 6.4 46 38 58 64
1/3 0.58 3.22 2.71 3.1 1.5 2.3 7.2 28 22 46 60
1 0.58 3.21 3.33 3.9 1.8 3.2 8.8 28 30 45 58
3 0.54 3.33 4.48 5.8 2.4 4.8 13.2 29 50 47 56
4 0 0 0.60 3.28 0.49 2.3 1.2 1.3 4.7 26 33 25 22
1/3 0.62 3.27 1.16 2.7 1.5 2.0 5.7 11 22 25 28
1 0.60 3.46 1.90 3.4 1.8 2.7 7.5 10 29 25 34
3 0.54 3.76 3.16 5.0 2.3 4.1 12.1 11 42 24 43
B. Optimization Across All Aggregate Models
0 0 0 0.71 0.76 0.55 2.1 1.1 1.4 14 24 33
1/3 0.63 0.64 1.72 2.6 1.4 2.0 8 17 24
1 0.64 0.42 2.78 3.3 1.6 2.7 8 17 22
3 0.64 0.37 4.37 5.0 1.9 4.0 10 18 20
4 0 0 0.72 1.26 0.39 2.2 1.2 1.2 20 29 20
1/3 0.64 1.40 1.46 2.6 1.5 1.9 8 19 17
1 0.62 1.38 2.56 3.3 1.7 2.6 8 19 17
3 0.62 1.42 4.17 4.9 2.0 3.8 9 20 16
Note: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and
κ) and for each preference parameter (λ), this table indicates the jointly opti-
mized interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α, and β), the contribution of the
individual model m to the policymaker’s loss function (Lm), and the percentage-
point diﬀerence of this contribution from the loss under the fully optimal policy
(%∆Lm).
loss function when the policymaker has uniform prior beliefs as to
which model in M is a plausible representation of the euro area
economy.
Panel A of table 3 reports the response coeﬃcients of outcome-
and forecast-based rules that are optimized across all four models
simultaneously (assuming uniform prior beliefs) and indicates the
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performance of these rules yielded in the individual models. Here,
performance is measured as the contributions of the individual mod-
els to the value of the policymaker’s overall loss function, Lm, and as
the percentage-point diﬀerence of these contributions from the losses
under the fully optimal policies, %∆Lm.
Starting with the outcome-based rules with θ = κ = 0, it turns
out that the jointly optimized (that is, Bayesian robust) policies are
heavily weighted toward those demanded by the DM, with the op-
timized interest-rate response coeﬃcients close to those implied by
the DM alone (see table 1). Speciﬁcally, the Bayesian robust poli-
cies prescribe a degree of interest-rate smoothing in the range of
0.5 to 0.6, while the responses to inﬂation and the output gap are
rather aggressive. The response to inﬂation is relatively stable at
around 3, while the response to the output gap varies quite a bit,
namely in the range of 2 to 4, depending on the weight given to
output stabilization. In light of the fault-tolerance analysis reported
above, this outcome is not really surprising, since, in the absence
of regions of high mutual tolerance with respect to some parame-
ter, the least tolerant model is supposed to be most inﬂuential in
shaping the operating characteristics of the robust policy with re-
spect to that parameter.21 Nevertheless, the robust policies perform
reasonably well in all four models, notably if a sensible weight is
given to output-gap stabilization, as can be seen when comparing
the outcomes under the robust policies with the performance mea-
sures reported in table 1. In fact, the increase in the reported losses
never exceeds 50 percentage points, even if the sole policy objective
is to stabilize inﬂation (i.e., for λ = 0), with the deterioration in
performance obviously smallest for the DM due to its inﬂuential role
in shaping the operating characteristics of the robust policies. This
ﬁnding is broadly consistent with the results documented in Levin
and Williams (2003) for a set of models of the U.S. economy includ-
ing the backward-looking model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
Also in this study, the contours of the robust policies are found to be
21In fact, the DM is rather intolerant to nontrivial deviations from the opti-
mized coeﬃcients implied by the DM alone, as can be seen in ﬁgure 2. Further-
more, the decisive role of the DM in our Bayesian analysis, after all, relates to
the fact that the baseline level of the loss for the DM is relatively high when
compared with the baseline losses for the other models.
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heavily weighted towards those demanded by the backward-looking
model.
Turning to the forecast-based rules with θ = 4 and κ = 0, the
performance of Bayesian robust policies is found to be even more
satisfactory across models. Yet again, this ﬁnding is not surprising
in light of the fault-tolerance analysis above indicating the existence
of regions of relatively high mutual tolerance for all three parameters.
However, the optimized parameters of the robust rules appear to be
largely inﬂuenced by the DM again.
To the extent that the robust policies for the full set of mod-
els are heavily weighted toward the policies demanded by the DM,
panel B of table 3 also reports results obtained when optimizing
across all aggregate models, but excluding the DM. In this case,
the robust policies are characterized by a uniformly higher degree
of interest-rate smoothing (in a range of 0.6 to 0.7) and, overall,
by less aggressive responses to inﬂation and the output gap. As
expected, the performance of the robust policies designed for the
two forward-looking models (CW and SW) and the AWM alone ap-
pears more favorable across these models when compared to the
performance under the robust rules designed for the full set of
models.
5. Sensitivity Analysis
Now we brieﬂy summarize some additional sensitivity analysis re-
garding the results presented above. First, we consider the impli-
cations of changing the weight µ on the variability of interest-rate
changes in the policymaker’s loss function. For the preceding anal-
ysis we have chosen a weight of µ = 0.1, which has been widely
employed in policy evaluation exercises like ours. As shown in ta-
ble B-1 in the appendix, with a weight of µ = 0.01 on interest-rate
variability, the relative stabilization performance of optimized rules
is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected when compared to the baseline results
reported in table 1 above. However, with the variability in interest-
rate changes penalized less, there are a number of noticeable diﬀer-
ences with regard to the pattern of the optimized coeﬃcients. First,
the response coeﬃcients to inﬂation and the output gap are a good
bit larger; second, for the backward-looking models, the optimal de-
gree of interest-rate smoothing is found to be even lower. However,
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despite these changes in the operating characteristics of the opti-
mized rules, we observe—by comparing the relative performance
measures reported in table B-2 with those in table 2—that the ro-
bustness properties of the optimized rules are broadly unaﬀected if
the weight on interest-rate variability is lowered to µ = 0.01. Finally,
as documented in table B-3, jointly optimized interest-rate rules are
yet again found to be weighted toward the DM, but with the rela-
tively favorable performance of robust forecast-based rules being less
clear-cut.
Regarding the sensitivity of our results with respect to using a
real-time information set with θ = κ = −1, table C-1 shows that
the performance of real-time-based rules tends to deteriorate rela-
tive to that of outcome-based rules. For the more backward-looking
models, this deterioration is rather pronounced (up to 69 and 34
percentage points for the AWM and the DM, respectively, depend-
ing on the weight given to output stabilization). Similarly, as shown
in table C-2, the robustness of real-time-based rules tends to be in-
ferior to that of outcome-based ones, resulting in a somewhat larger
deterioration of performance across models. Finally, as indicated in
table C-3, the performance of robust real-time-based rules is slightly
inferior across models as well.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the performance and robustness of op-
timized interest-rate rules in four models of the euro area that dif-
fer considerably in terms of size, degree of aggregation, relevance
of forward-looking behavioral elements, and adherence to micro-
foundations. Based on our examination, we conclude that simple
interest-rate rules that are optimized for a given model may per-
form satisfactorily in models with a rather similar structure but
may result in a dramatic deterioration of performance in models
with markedly diﬀerent features. In particular, rules that are de-
signed for largely forward-looking models tend to perform poorly
in predominantly backward-looking models, although the reverse is
not necessarily true. In view of this asymmetry, we ﬁnd that the
operating characteristics of interest-rate rules that are optimized
across our set of models simultaneously are heavily weighted toward
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those required by the backward-looking models. Nevertheless, the
Bayesian robust policies identiﬁed in such a way perform reasonably
well in all four models, notably if a sensible weight is given to out-
put stabilization. Especially, we ﬁnd that a forecast-based rule that
relates the short-term interest rate to the one-year-ahead forecast
of inﬂation and the contemporaneous output gap and (importantly)
that allows for only a moderate degree of inertia, attains reasonable
outcomes.
While other model features such as variable and country cover-
age and adherence to microfoundations are apparently of relevance
as well, the nature of the expectation formation mechanism embed-
ded in the various models seems to be of key importance for ex-
plaining our results. This in turn suggests that future research that
aims at casting light on the empirical relevance of forward-looking
behavioral elements in macroeconomic models may enhance the re-
liability and usefulness of interest-rate rules for model-based evalu-
ations of monetary policy. Of course, in the case that a policy rule
prescribed to set the interest rate in response to forecasts of fu-
ture inﬂation, we assumed in our analysis that these forecasts hap-
pened to be consistent with the structure of the particular model in
which the performance of the forecast-based rule was evaluated. Sim-
ilarly, the measure of the output gap used when evaluating the rule
was consistent with the output-gap concept employed in that par-
ticular model. To the extent that the monetary policymaker faces
uncertainty regarding the reliability of the inﬂation forecast itself
or the correct measurement of the output gap, these additional
sources of uncertainty may heighten the risks associated with re-
lying too heavily on a rule optimized for any particular model.22
Extensions of our study along these directions are left for future
research.
22Indeed, the analysis in Coenen (2003) shows that erroneously relying on the
false forecasting model may result in a signiﬁcant deterioration of the stabilization
performance of a forecast-based rule, even when the rule itself is designed under
the assumption that the structure of the economy is known. The consequences of
relying on alternative, possibly inconsistent output-gap concepts is analyzed in
Smets and Wouters (2002).
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Appendix
Table A. Detailed Results for the Optimized Interest-Rate
Rules
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
θ κ λ σπ σy σ∆i L σπ σy σ∆i L
0 0 0 1.33 2.30 0.80 1.83 0.93 2.47 0.47 0.95
1/3 1.45 1.07 0.82 2.54 1.06 0.60 0.87 1.33
1 1.48 0.91 1.26 3.17 1.08 0.40 1.21 1.48
3 1.48 0.83 1.93 4.65 1.09 0.28 1.68 1.71
4 0 0 1.35 2.09 0.79 1.89 0.94 2.44 0.51 0.98
1/3 1.47 1.02 0.83 2.58 1.07 0.58 0.87 1.34
1 1.48 0.90 1.26 3.18 1.08 0.40 1.21 1.48
3 1.49 0.83 1.91 4.65 1.09 0.29 1.64 1.70
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
θ κ λ σπ σy σ∆i L σπ σy σ∆i L
0 0 0 1.09 1.57 1.04 1.30 2.15 1.68 3.69 5.97
1/3 1.07 1.17 1.74 1.90 2.17 1.60 3.62 6.86
1 1.07 0.91 2.50 2.59 2.22 1.50 3.59 8.45
3 1.07 0.69 3.52 3.79 2.36 1.36 3.68 12.48
4 0 0 1.04 1.59 1.01 1.19 1.89 1.58 3.29 4.64
1/3 1.02 1.16 1.69 1.78 1.90 1.51 3.24 5.44
1 1.03 0.90 2.43 2.46 1.95 1.43 3.23 6.87
3 1.04 0.69 3.42 3.65 2.07 1.31 3.34 10.56
Note: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ),
for each preference parameter (λ), and for each model, this table indicates the
unconditional standard deviations of the target variables (σπ , σy , and σ∆i) and
the value of the policymaker’s loss function (L).
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Table B-1. The Stabilization Performance of Optimized
Interest-Rate Rules Generated with a Lower Weight of
µ = 0.01 on Interest-Rate Variability
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
θ κ λ ρ α β L %∆L ρ α β L %∆L
0 0 0 0.98 2.98 0.25 1.7 1 1.03 1.71 0.16 0.9 2
1/3 0.75 1.26 2.29 2.4 5 0.99 1.92 5.25 1.2 9
1 0.73 0.74 4.09 2.9 4 1.02 0.83 11.22 1.3 6
3 0.69 0.44 6.54 4.0 3 1.00 0.84 20.93 1.3 4
4 0 0 2.75 29.26 −0.24 1.7 5 2.32 18.26 −0.06 0.9 4
1/3 0.79 3.30 2.14 2.5 7 1.01 3.40 4.73 1.2 9
1 0.73 1.96 4.14 2.9 4 1.00 2.49 10.32 1.3 7
3 0.68 1.33 6.62 4.0 3 1.00 1.72 20.42 1.3 4
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
θ κ λ ρ α β L %∆L ρ α β L %∆L
0 0 0 0.17 3.05 3.00 1.1 24 0.11 13.83 8.33 3.8 41
1/3 0.42 2.03 6.57 1.4 12 0.02 13.24 9.11 4.8 42
1 0.51 1.37 9.71 1.6 9 0.00 11.88 9.65 6.4 42
3 0.55 0.84 14.55 2.0 6 0.00 9.94 10.22 10.4 41
4 0 0 0.23 6.76 1.16 1.0 11 0.39 10.58 1.53 2.9 9
1/3 0.30 5.57 4.69 1.3 5 0.27 10.43 2.30 3.8 12
1 0.37 4.53 8.08 1.6 4 0.15 10.28 3.33 5.2 16
3 0.44 3.53 13.10 2.0 4 0.00 9.83 5.12 8.8 19
Note: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and
κ), for each preference parameter (λ), and for each model, this table indicates
the optimized interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α, and β), the value of the
policymaker’s loss function (L), and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter
from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L).
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Table B-2. The Robustness of Optimized Interest-Rate
Rules Generated with a Lower Weight of µ = 0.01 on
Interest-Rate Variability
A. Rules Optimized for the Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules Optimized for CW Rules Optimized for SW
L %∆L L %∆L
θ κ λ SW AWM DM SW AWM DM CW AWM DM CW AWM DM
0 0 0 0.9 ∞ ∞ 3 ∞ ∞ 1.7 ∞ ∞ 4 ∞ ∞
1/3 1.3 1.7 17.6 12 36 420 2.6 1.7 ∞ 13 34 ∞
1 1.4 1.9 97.4 13 29 2046 3.6 1.9 ∞ 31 29 ∞
3 1.5 2.5 ∞ 17 30 ∞ 6.5 2.2 ∞ 67 16 ∞
4 0 0 0.9 ∞ ∞ 4 ∞ ∞ 1.7 ∞ ∞ 6 ∞ ∞
1/3 1.3 1.6 27.3 12 30 704 2.6 1.8 ∞ 13 43 ∞
1 1.3 1.8 30.3 12 21 567 3.5 1.8 ∞ 25 23 ∞
3 1.5 2.4 90.2 16 23 1125 6.3 2.3 ∞ 63 18 ∞
B. Rules Optimized for the Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules Optimized for AWM Rules Optimized for DM
L %∆L L %∆L
θ κ λ CW SW DM CW SW DM CW SW AWM CW SW AWM
0 0 0 2.1 1.2 17.6 28 30 556 2.6 1.2 1.3 57 29 44
1/3 2.5 1.3 52.7 10 12 1454 3.0 1.4 1.5 31 26 19
1 3.1 1.3 199.4 11 10 4291 3.7 2.8 1.7 33 47 14
3 4.5 1.4 ∞ 15 9 ∞ 5.4 2.5 2.2 39 92 17
4 0 0 1.9 1.2 24.8 18 33 824 2.1 1.2 1.1 27 30 15
1/3 2.6 1.3 32.0 12 16 842 3.3 1.4 1.5 41 26 21
1 3.0 1.4 60.7 9 13 1237 3.3 1.7 2.0 17 45 33
3 4.3 1.4 342.5 10 12 4551 4.9 2.4 3.0 26 88 54
Note: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ),
for each preference parameter (λ), and for each model, this table indicates the
value of the policymaker’s loss function (L) and the percentage-point diﬀerence
of the latter from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L), when the rule
optimized for model m is evaluated in model n = m. The notation “∞” indicates
that the implemented rule results in instability.
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Table B-3. The Stabilization Performance of Bayesian
Robust Interest-Rate Rules Generated with a Lower
Weight of µ = 0.01 on Interest-Rate Variability
Lm generated in %∆Lm generated in
θ κ λ ρ α β CW SW AWM DM CW SW AWM DM
A. Optimization Across All Models
0 0 0 0.42 8.54 5.81 2.3 1.1 1.2 3.9 39 25 32 46
1/3 0.39 7.86 6.69 2.7 1.3 1.6 5.0 17 18 27 47
1 0.33 7.63 8.02 3.3 1.6 2.0 6.7 20 31 36 49
3 0.21 7.54 10.31 4.9 2.0 2.9 11.0 26 60 53 49
4 0 0 0.47 8.62 1.19 2.2 1.2 1.1 3.9 33 28 14 45
1/3 0.45 8.14 3.17 2.5 1.3 1.4 4.7 10 17 13 38
1 0.38 8.31 4.93 3.0 1.5 1.7 6.2 10 23 16 37
3 0.26 8.56 7.56 4.3 1.8 2.3 10.3 12 39 22 39
B. Optimization Across All Aggregate Models
0 0 0 0.56 2.73 1.53 2.0 1.1 1.2 21 21 32
1/3 0.59 1.74 4.78 2.5 1.2 1.4 7 11 14
1 0.63 1.04 7.03 3.0 1.3 1.7 6 10 12
3 0.61 0.65 10.37 4.1 1.4 2.1 6 11 10
4 0 0 0.64 4.78 0.81 2.1 1.1 1.1 29 25 16
1/3 0.57 3.77 4.07 2.5 1.3 1.3 8 13 7
1 0.59 3.09 6.63 3.0 1.3 1.6 6 11 7
3 0.58 2.66 10.17 4.1 1.4 2.1 6 12 7
Note: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and
κ) and for each preference parameter (λ), this table indicates the jointly opti-
mized interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α, and β), the contribution of the
individual model m to the policymaker’s loss function (Lm), and the percentage-
point diﬀerence of this contribution from the loss under the fully optimal policy
(%∆Lm).
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Table C-1. The Stabilization Performance of Optimized
Interest-Rate Rules Based on a Real-Time Information
Set with θ = κ = −1
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
λ ρ α β L %∆L ρ α β L %∆L
0 0.95 0.79 0.11 1.8 2 1.02 0.79 0.08 1.0 3
1/3 0.76 0.48 0.91 2.6 6 0.98 0.56 1.38 1.4 11
1 0.74 0.29 1.58 3.2 5 0.96 0.35 2.62 1.6 12
3 0.72 0.28 2.43 4.8 6 0.98 0.00 3.44 1.9 20
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
λ ρ α β L %∆L ρ α β L %∆L
0 0.42 0.99 1.11 1.4 34 0.17 6.07 4.26 7.3 88
1/3 0.27 0.82 2.16 2.2 40 0.13 6.06 4.46 8.3 85
1 0.26 0.54 3.19 3.4 55 0.07 6.02 4.77 10.1 81
3 0.25 0.34 4.60 6.1 84 0.00 5.79 5.30 14.8 74
Note: For each preference parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates
the optimized interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α, and β), the value of the
policymaker’s loss function (L), and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter
from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L).
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Table C-2. The Robustness of Optimized Interest-Rate
Rules Based on a Real-Time Information Set with
θ = κ = −1
A. Rules Optimized for the Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules Optimized for CW Rules Optimized for SW
L %∆L %L %∆L
λ SW AWM DM SW AWM DM CW AWM DM CW AWM DM
0 1.0 ∞ ∞ 6 ∞ ∞ 1.9 ∞ ∞ 4 ∞ ∞
1/3 1.4 2.8 66.7 18 80 1388 2.8 13.7 68.0 14 766 1417
1 1.7 4.5 ∞ 24 103 ∞ 3.8 21.4 ∞ 23 872 ∞
3 2.2 8.5 ∞ 38 157 ∞ ME ∞ ∞ ME ∞ ∞
B. Rules Optimized for the Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules Optimized for AWM Rules Optimized for DM
L %∆L L %∆L
λ CW SW DM CW SW DM CW SW AWM CW SW AWM
0 2.2 1.3 94.5 20 36 2345 3.5 1.6 2.5 93 71 140
1/3 2.7 1.6 ∞ 11 29 ∞ 3.9 1.9 3.2 61 50 106
1 ME 1.9 ∞ ME 38 ∞ 4.8 2.3 4.6 59 67 110
3 ME 2.6 ∞ ME 58 ∞ 7.1 3.5 8.0 57 115 143
Note: For each preference parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates
the value of the policymaker’s loss function (L) and the percentage-point diﬀer-
ence of the latter from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L), when the
rule optimized for model m is evaluated in model n = m. The notation “ME”
indicates that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria; the notation “∞”
indicates that the implemented rule results in instability.
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Table C-3. The Stabilization Performance of Bayesian
Robust Interest-Rate Rules Based on a Real-Time
Information Set with θ = κ = −1
Lm generated in %∆Lm generated in
λ ρ α β CW SW AWM DM CW SW AWM DM
A. Optimization Across All Models
0 0.41 3.62 2.52 2.7 1.3 1.9 7.8 48 44 81 103
1/3 0.41 3.57 2.88 3.2 1.6 2.8 8.7 31 30 80 95
1 0.39 3.62 3.46 4.1 2.0 4.3 10.6 33 44 95 89
3 0.32 3.75 4.54 6.2 2.9 7.4 15.5 37 76 125 82
B. Optimization Across All Aggregate Models
0 0.65 0.78 0.61 2.1 1.2 1.4 14 26 40
1/3 0.51 0.64 1.70 2.6 1.5 2.3 8 22 44
1 0.47 0.57 2.68 3.3 1.8 3.5 9 29 60
3 0.41 0.59 4.10 5.1 2.4 6.2 13 45 88
Note: For each preference parameter (λ), this table indicates the jointly opti-
mized interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α, and β), the contribution of the
individual model m to the policymaker’s loss function (Lm), and the percentage-
point diﬀerence of this contribution from the loss under the fully optimal policy
(%∆Lm).
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